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WITHOUT OTHER OPTIONS: THE LIMITED
EFFECTIVENESS, UNIQUE AVAILABILITY,
AND OVERALL IMPACT OF STATEDIRECTED LAWSUITS AGAINST
PREDATORY LENDERS
Justin Collins*
INTRODUCTION
In recent months, people reading or watching the news have
been bombarded with stories about subprime loans, a sharp rise in
foreclosures, and the tenuous state of the mortgage industry. 1 In
2006, there were 1.2 million foreclosure filings in the United
States—up 42 percent from 2005.2 Based on current rates in 2006,
foreclosure filings are predicted to rise to two million in 2007, a

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A. in Urban Studies, University
of Pennsylvania, 2004. The author would like to thank Mom, Dad, Alex, and
Sona, for all their support throughout this entire process, as well as Professor
David Reiss and the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for the advice and
guidance they provided in connection with this Note.
1
See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Democrats Prepare Bills to Tighten
Loan Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at C1; Editorial, Subprime Mortgages:
Get Help to Homeowners, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 4, 2007; Housing Woes Hurt
NovaStar and Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at C10; Subprime Squeeze
Hits Automakers; Fewer Buyers Finance Cars, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at
A01; Adam Thomson, Regulators’ Call to Help Homeowners, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2007, at 8. These articles represent only a fraction of the articles appearing in
major national and international newspapers during the week of September 3,
2007, discussing the current crisis in the subprime loan industry.
2
RealtyTrac is a real estate resource site billing itself as ―The nation‘s # 1
source of foreclosure listings.‖ RealtyTrac Home Page, http://www.realtytrac.
com (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
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rate approaching heights not seen since the Great Depression. 3 At
the core of this crisis is the subprime loan industry, which
furnishes high-interest loans to individuals and families with ―less
than pristine credit‖ that cannot qualify for a loan at the prime
interest rate because they are considered to be higher credit risks. 4
The media has failed to address the predatory nature of many of
these loans, which are generally given to low-income borrowers.5
The clustering of these predatory loans in at-risk, low- and
moderate-income communities has resulted in mass foreclosure
and the destruction of entire neighborhoods and communities. 6
Home ownership is increasingly touted as a community
development strategy and a means for lower-income Americans to
accumulate wealth, achieve financial stability, and move into the
middle class. 7 However, predatory lending has gradually eroded
3

Nelson Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, at BU1.
4
Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of
Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2277 (2004).
5
Id.
6
Emily Brady, Stranger at the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at CY4.
A clear example of the clustering of predatory loans in a community and
resulting foreclosures is Southeastern Queens. Id. In communities of color in
that part of New York City, studies have demonstrated notably high levels of
foreclosures, which have been attributed to higher rates of subprime lending. Id.
Foreclosed properties damage the value of nearby homes and the tax
bases of municipalities. There is also a strong correlation between
foreclosures and crime rates. For every one percentage point increase in
a neighborhood‘s foreclosure rate, violent crime rises 2.3 percent,
according to a recent study by Dan Immergluck of the Georgia Institute
of Technology and Geoff Smith of Woodstock Institute, a research and
advocacy organization in Chicago.
Editorial, Spreading the Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at A30.
Furthermore, housing vacancies appear to lead to prostitution, vagrancy, and
drug dealing. Id.
7
Kathe Newman, Race, Politics, and Community Development in U.S.
Cities: Newark, Decline and Avoidance, Renaissance and Desire: From
Disinvestment to Reinvestment, 594 ANNALS 34, 35–36 (2004). Newman
disagrees with the idea of homeownership as an effective economic
development strategy for the poorest urban neighborhoods, but she notes and
discusses it as a popular strategy among city and other government officials. Id.
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communities of homeowners because of lax federal regulations and
the preemption of state laws. 8 In the past decade, states have
responded with a new strategy whereby state Attorneys General
file suits against unscrupulous lenders. 9 While these suits have
received great media attention and have led to multi-million dollar
settlements,10 experts and politicians are still debating whether this
approach to curbing predatory lending has been, or will be,
successful.
This Note will explore the tactic of Attorneys General suing
predatory lenders, focusing on how it has been only partially
effective, what it has taught and can continue to teach lawmakers,
and how it can be effectively used to develop a comprehensive
anti-predatory lending and consumer protection strategy in the
future. Part I will provide a background on the development of the
subprime mortgage industry, the methods utilized by predatory
lenders, and existing law regarding predatory lending. Part II will
examine how states have responded to the shortfall of federal law
and federal restrictions on state action, and will address how states
have employed the method of Attorneys General filing suits
against predatory lenders. Part III will evaluate the success of this
strategy, arguing that while state-directed lawsuits may be the best
anti-predatory lending tool available in light of federal preemption,
they have fallen short of stemming systemic change. Additionally,
Part III will propose potential solutions for the future, based on the
current activities in the subprime market, and will discuss
important knowledge gained from state-directed lawsuits to further
develop anti-predatory lending strategies.

See also U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF POL‘Y DEV &
RESEARCH, IDEAS THAT WORK: BUILDING COMMUNITIES THROUGH
HOMEOWNERSHIP (2006), available at www.huduser.org/Publications/Pdf/ideas
thatwork.pdf [hereinafter HUD, IDEAS].
8
See Spreading the Misery, supra note 6.
9
Thomas Miller, Remarks to the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Iowa Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 1
(Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/
releases/aug_2007/Federal_Reserve_HOEPA.pdf.
10
See infra notes 117–36 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND – THE RISE OF THE SUBPRIME INDUSTRY AND
PREDATORY LENDING
Home ownership has long been touted as a means to achieve
financial stability and economic success, for individuals, families,
and neighborhoods.11 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (―HUD‖) refers to homeowners as ―more likely to
maintain their properties, thereby improving their neighborhoods
and surrounding communities.‖ 12 These improvements ―help to
stabilize neighborhoods, which, in turn, are able to access
resources to improve schools, support small businesses and
churches, and build the capacity of community-based
organizations.‖13 Throughout American history, and most notably
since Franklin Delano Roosevelt‘s New Deal, policymakers have
tied home ownership to citizenship.14 As a result, ―after 1948, the
national incidence of annual [residential] mobility dropped by
more than 50 percent; the five-year rate by more than 40
percent.‖15 Stable homeowner communities were developing
nationwide. 16 During this period, residential mobility decreased for
renters as well as homeowners, but increased home ownership
11

HUD, IDEAS, supra note 7.
Id.
13
Id. at vii.
14
In their examination of residential mobility, homeownership, and
citizenship (particularly focused on Riverside, California), Ronald Tobey,
Charles Wetherell, and Jay Brigham write that President Roosevelt:
badly wanted to [create federal housing policy to] modernize the
nation‘s housing stock, not simply in order to improve the quality of
life for the American people but to engender a revitalized idea of
citizenship that directly and specifically involved homeownership.
Although the Lockean notion that citizens should have a property stake
in society had persisted as a major theme in American political culture
virtually undiluted since the eighteenth century, it was the sheer power
of the New Deal state that made possible implementation of the idea.
Ronald Tobey, Charles Wetherell, & Jay Brigham, Moving Out and Settling In:
Residential Mobility, Home Owning, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship,
1921-1950, 95 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1395, 1395–96 (1990).
15
Id. at 1402–03.
16
Id.
12
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appears to have directly coincided with the development of
communities with long-term residents.17 Along with home
ownership, the mortgage industry grew rapidly, culminating in the
mortgage crisis we see today. 18
A. The Roots of the Mortgage Industry and Subprime Lending
Middle-class homeowners with strong credit have traditionally
financed home purchases through conventional, ―prime rate‖
mortgages.19 Prior to the 1980s, these loans were virtually the only
mortgages available, and they were only granted to individuals
with strong credit and steady employment. 20 However, the
mortgage market changed significantly in the early 1980s as a
result of deregulation legislation that eliminated state restrictions
on interest rates and loan payment structures.21 For example, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(―DIDMCA‖) of 1980 eliminated state interest rate caps, and the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (―AMTPA‖) of 1982
opened the door for adjustable rate mortgages and balloon payment
structures.22 Additionally, the Tax Reform Act (―TRA‖) of 1986
made ―high-cost mortgage debt cheaper than consumer debt,‖ thus
making subprime lending much more profitable. 23 Subsequently,
17

In addition to increased homeownership and programs developed to
enable this, other programs developed during the New Deal and postwar period,
such as rent control, helped to established more stable renter communities. Id. at
1404–05.
18
Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution
of the Subprime Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW,
January/February 2006, 88(1), 31, 38, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf.
19
Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).
20
David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allowed
Predatory Lending To Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 985, 992–93 (2006).
21
Chomsisengphet &Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 31, 38.
22
Id.
23
―The TRA increased the demand for mortgage debt because it prohibited
the deduction of interest on consumer loans, yet allowed interest deductions on

COLLINS

236

4/16/2009 4:17 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the subprime market expanded greatly throughout the 1990s. 24 Due
to the TRA, borrowers began to use mortgages like regular
consumer loans, often at the suggestion of lenders, by using equity
in their home to secure needed cash or consolidate debt. 25
Proponents of subprime lending argue that it has expanded
access to home ownership for low-income communities and
families with poor credit, but this assertion has been shown to be
inaccurate due to the high rate of subprime loans on refinance
mortgages.26 Even though ―the rate of minority and low-income
home ownership has increased over the past decade,‖ this cannot
be conclusively tied to subprime lending because, according to
industry data, 82 percent of subprime mortgages were refinances as
opposed to home purchases. 27
B. Defining Subprime Loans and Predatory Lending
There is no exact standard for establishing which loans are
―subprime,‖ and the individual lenders determine who falls below
the credit threshold necessary for a prime loan. 28 Currently, lenders
rate the credit risk of potential borrowers using a graded system,
with ―A‖ as the best possible credit and ―D‖ as the worst.29 Prime
rate borrowers traditionally have ―A‖ credit, while all others fall

mortgages for a primary residence as well as one additional home.‖ Id. at 38.
24
Id.
25
Due to this fact, the vast majority of home mortgages are being used as if
they were credit cards or personal loans. The only difference is that they are
secured by the buyer‘s home. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending
Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 13–14 (Seton Hall
Public
Law
Working
Paper
No.
20,
2004),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=594042.
26
Id. at 11–12.
27
Results are as of 2004. Id. at 12.
28
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE,
CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN
COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 1, 21 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.
29
Peterson, supra note 19, at 9.
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into the subprime category.30 Since their inception, subprime loans
have increased rapidly, and in 2004 they accounted for almost
twenty percent of furnished loans. 31
Subprime loans take on various forms. 32 However, subprime
clients are generally deemed to be a greater credit risk due to their
weaker credit ratings, which disqualify them from prime-rate
loans. Accordingly, the interest rates on subprime loans are
inherently higher than on prime loans. 33 In addition, these loans
often come with higher points and settlement fees than prime
loans.34 Furthermore, the vast majority of subprime loans are
refinances of existing debt, as opposed to mortgages used to
purchase a home.35 Another common trend across the subprime
industry is its target population, as it has disproportionately
affected communities of color and other vulnerable populations. 36
While ―A‖ loans, and as of late, some ―A-‖ loans, have been
sold by lenders on the secondary market to government-sponsored
purchasers such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, subprime loans
30

Id.
Reiss, supra note 20, at 994.
32
These forms include refinances to borrowers with poor credit, loans to
buyers with credit histories similar to those eligible for ―A‖ loans but with
limited documentation, and ―high loan-to-value (LTV) refinance mortgages,‖
which allow borrowers to take out loans worth nearly as much as, or sometimes
even more than, their homes. Id. at 995.
33
Id.
34
Points and fees are up-front payments, or amounts financed into the loan
principal, ostensibly to ―compensate for higher origination and servicing costs
that lenders claim subprime loans have.‖ Id. at 995–96.
35
Id. at 996.
36
Professor David Reiss notes that:
African Americans and Hispanics combined made up less than eight
percent of the prime home purchase market in 1998, but such
borrowers made up nearly twenty percent of the subprime home
purchase mortgage market in that same year. Similarly, AfricanAmerican and Hispanic borrowers together make up about six percent
of all prime conventional refinance mortgages and seventeen percent of
subprime refinance mortgages. And more than half of all loans in
predominantly African-American communities are subprime, compared
to only nine percent in predominantly white communities.
Reiss, supra note 20, at 997.
31

COLLINS

238

4/16/2009 4:17 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

have a far more varied system of sale to secondary-market
investors.37 In contrast to the manner in which prime loans are
furnished and sold, subprime loans are generally originated by a
lender and then are quickly sold in bundles with other subprime
loans to investors on the secondary market through a process called
―securitiziation.‖38 Most securitized loans are purchased by
institutional investors.39 Due to securitization, lenders are far more
willing to furnish borrowers with unaffordable loans because they
eliminate all risk of loss when they sell the loans to investors. 40
When foreclosure occurs, the holder of the loan, as opposed to the
originator, takes the loss. 41 Recently, due to mass foreclosures,
investors on the secondary market have faced huge losses. 42
However, some other investors, mostly hedge funds, have
purchased derivative contracts that have enabled them to make
37

Part of this is due to the higher underwriting requirements of
government-sponsored buyers. Other secondary-market purchasers have far
more lax standards. Peterson, supra note 19, at 9–10.
38
Subprime lenders are frequently not traditional banks or depositary
institutions, and as such, they frequently borrow money from Wall Street to
finance their loan transactions. In order to pay Wall Street back, and limit their
risk of loss (which is particularly high in subprime loans, due to high rates of
foreclosure), they engage in a process called securitization. Securitization is a
process in which, after an originator has held the loan for sixty to ninety days,
the loan is combined with other subprime loans into an aggregate fund, and sold
to institutional investors. The institutional investor then generally sells shares in
this fund to individual investors. The originator of the loan uses the funds earned
from selling the loans to investors to pay back the lenders who provided them
with the funds to furnish the subprime loan. Patrick Madigan, Memorandum:
Overview of the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis 5 (Sept. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/predatorylend.
39
Reiss, supra note 20, at 1002.
40
When mortgage originators sell loans on the secondary market, the
investors purchase both the loans and their risk of default, and the lenders
receive cash for the loans‘ value. Madigan, supra note 38, at 5.
41
Id.
42
Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs, three of the nation‘s
largest investment firms, have lost billions of dollars due to investments in
securitized subprime loans that have ended up in foreclosure. Bloomberg News,
Holding of Debt Securities Falls Again at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007,
at C5. See also Associated Press, Judge Rejects Bankruptcy for Two Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C4.
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money precisely in the situation when loans fail and borrowers go
into foreclosure.43
Predatory lending and the subprime loan industry go hand in
hand. 44 The prime rate market is strictly regulated due to the
presence of ―such regulated entities as banks and credit unions, as
well as through robust competition among lenders, more informed
borrowers and simpler, more homogenous loan terms.‖45 In
contrast, the subprime market is relatively free of regulation. 46
While not all subprime lending is predatory,47 virtually all
predatory lending occurs on subprime loan transactions. 48
Predatory lending is a malleable concept,49 but can generally be
defined as deceptive lending practices that are used to prey upon
unsophisticated and low-income borrowers.50 Predatory lenders
employ numerous practices that are present even in legitimate loan
transactions, including balloon payments,51 adjustable rate

43

This fact has hurt borrowers even more, as it has prevented borrowers
from modifying bad loans, as the holders of the loans, often hedge funds, want
them to fail. Madigan, supra note 38, at 7.
44
Reiss, supra note 20, at 997.
45
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization,
And the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 571
(2002).
46
Id.
47
Peterson, supra note 19, at 11.
48
Reiss, supra note 20, at 998.
49
Bagley, supra note 4, at 2277–78.
50
Id. See also Eggert, supra note 45, at 507.
51
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (―NCRC‖) defines a
―balloon mortgage‖ as a:
[t]ype of mortgage loan in which the final payment is significantly
larger than the payments that are made over the mortgage term. Buyers
might choose a balloon mortgage if they anticipate refinancing at the
end of the term, if they have enough money to pay off the loan in a
lump sum, or if they can afford to buy only because of the
comparatively smaller monthly payments that may be available with a
balloon mortgage.
National Community Reinvestment Coalition Glossary, available at
http://www.ncrc.org/consumerresources/glossary.php (last visited Sept. 23,
2008).
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mortgages (―ARMs‖),52 frequent refinances, and inflated fees and
interest rates.53 These terms are frequently misrepresented by the
lender and are not properly understood by the borrower, and many
subprime customers pay fees of over eight percent of the loan
amount.54 In many cases, lenders furnish loans to borrowers with
no expectation that the borrowers will be able to repay. 55 As of
2002, it was estimated that predatory lending cost borrowers in the
United States $9.1 billion, not including the greatest cost of all—
mortgage foreclosure and loss of their homes. 56
Predatory lending schemes frequently involve multiple actors
in addition to mortgage lenders.57 Often, predatory lenders work
with unethical mortgage brokers to lure consumers into more
expensive loans with higher interest rates and higher fees paid both
to the broker and the lender. 58 In return for these ―services,‖ the
brokers receive a payment from the lender called a ―yield spread
premium,‖ which is often concealed by lenders.59 Low-income
families, immigrants, and people of color are often trapped in these

52

The NCRC defines ―adjustable rate mortgages‖ as mortgages that:
[U]sually start with a lower interest rate than a fixed-rate mortgage,
therefore lowering monthly payments. This allows the borrower to
qualify for a larger mortgage than would be possible with a fixed-rate
mortgage. The interest rate on an ARM is adjusted periodically based
on an index that reflects changing market interest rates. When the
interest rate is adjusted, the monthly payment goes up or down.
Id.
53

Eggert, supra note 45, at 513.
Id. at 513–14.
55
Id. at 515. This is often done through falsification of the borrower‘s
income by brokers on loan application forms to show a ―higher income or asset
level.‖ Id. This practice is known as ―equity stripping,‖ as borrowers generally
go into foreclosure and lose all equity in their homes. Id.
56
Id. at 507.
57
Peterson, supra note 19, at 16.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 16–17. A yield spread premium is a payment made directly by the
lender to the broker, paid out of proceeds from the consumer‘s loan payments.
Frequently, if a borrower pays a higher rate on his or her loan, the broker who
steered him or her to the loan will receive a greater yield spread premium from
the lender. Id.
54
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schemes, as they more frequently depend on professionals in
conducting mortgage transactions. 60 In response to these multiplayer predatory lending schemes, the federal government and
numerous states have proposed various laws to prevent abuses by
many of these parties. 61
C. Regulatory Legislation at the Federal Level
The Federal Government and several state governments have
proposed diverse solutions to the scourge of predatory lending. The
Truth-in-Lending Act (―TILA‖) was enacted primarily to ―promote
the informed use of consumer credit,‖ by providing disclosure
requirements and remedies for borrowers.62 Due to the TILA and
its more recent amendments, borrowers must be provided with the
―critical elements of credit cost‖ by their lender, including the
finance charge, annual interest rate (APR or ―annual percentage
rate‖), and various other disclosures. 63 The TILA differentiates
―between open-end credit plans [such as credit cards] and closed
end transactions,‖64 such as mortgages, and mandates additional
disclosures to and rights for borrowers in closed end transactions. 65
60

―Immigrants and minority borrowers are particularly dependent upon real
estate professionals because they may not speak fluent English or understand the
complex loan terms and documents, which can certainly confound native
speakers as well.‖ Vikas Bajaj & Miguel Helft, The Loan That Keeps on Taking,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at C1. Frequently, non-English-speaking borrowers
sign loan documents in English, at the advice of mortgage brokers and other
professionals, even though the negotiations related to the mortgage were
conducted in their native language. All the professionals involved earn
―lucrative fees.‖ Id.
61
See infra notes 62–114 and accompanying text.
62
RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 4 (2000), 4-5;
15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2007); 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2007).
63
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 62, at 4–5; 15 U.S.C. § 1605; 15 U.S.C. §
1631 (2007).
64
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 62, at 4–5.
65
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (2007), 15 U.S.C. § 1631. For open-ended
consumer credit plans, such as credit cards, creditors must disclose the nature
and conditions of any finance charges that may be imposed, as well as other
disclosures related to finance charges, and whether or not any security interest
has been taken in any of the borrower‘s assets, along with a few other limited
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In addition to disclosures, the TILA mandates a ―right to cancel‖ or
rescind for borrowers entering refinance mortgage transactions.66
Under the TILA, lenders must now provide borrowers in all
mortgage transactions with forms detailing interest rates, total
payments, pay schedules, and other information important to the
consumer, both prior to closing and at closing. 67
Unfortunately, the success of the TILA depends on very
informed borrowers, because much of the essential information
about a mortgage is buried among thousands of pages of form
contract provisions, discouraging consumers from reading them. 68
Generally, consumers simply sign the closing papers. 69 In addition,
some brokers and lenders commit outright fraud, making changes
to documents after they have been signed. 70
The TILA is not the only federal law that has been passed in an
attempt to stop predatory lending. In 1974, Congress passed the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (―RESPA‖), 71 which
prohibits practices by lenders such as kickbacks and referral fees, 72
limits the amount that borrowers must place in escrow accounts
disclosures. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2007). For closed-end credit plans like
mortgages, TILA mandates more expansive disclosures, including: disclosures
of the amount of actual credit available to the borrower under this transaction;
the total cost of credit; total payments; the number, amount, and due dates of all
payments; and other important disclosures essential to understanding the cost of
credit and the nature of payments. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2007).
66
Borrowers have up to three business days to rescind the mortgage,
pursuant to a mandatory notice of right to cancel provided by the lender.
However, if this notice is not provided, the borrower has up to three years to
cancel the transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2007).
67
See 15 U.S.C. § 1638.
68
See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
69
See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
70
Chris Arnold, Former Ameriquest Workers Tell of Deception (Morning
Edition, National Public Radio Broadcast, May 14, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10165859.
71
RESPA was amended in 1976. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. (2007).
72
Kickbacks and referral fees are payments made by lenders to brokers and
other agents in exchange for no services other than referring a consumer to or
placing an application with that lender. KENNETH R. REDDEN & JAMES
MCCLELLAN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER-CREDITOR RELATIONS 102
(1982).
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when buying a home, and mandates both additional disclosures of
settlement costs and a uniform settlement statement.73 The RESPA
was passed with the goal of ensuring that consumers get better and
more timely information regarding the costs of their transaction
and are protected from high fees and other abusive lending
practices.74 While the RESPA does mandate uniformity for
information given to borrowers by lenders and prohibits kickbacks,
it does little else: it does not set any limits for fees or costs, fails to
set forth best practices, and fails to develop or mandate any ethical
standard for lenders or other real estate professionals. 75
The strongest federal protection for homebuyers against
predatory lending is the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act of 1994 (―HOEPA‖).76 The HOEPA provides additional
protections for borrowers facing ―high-cost‖ loans.77 These are
home loans in which the APR is eight percentage points over the
treasury rate on first-lien loans or ten percent above for
subordinate-lien loans, or those in which points and fees
amounting to higher than eight percent of the loan‘s principal or
$400, whichever is greater.78
Under the HOEPA, lenders that trigger the law must provide
disclosures in addition to those mandated by the TILA, and are
prevented from including certain terms in their loans, such as
balloon payments (except for loans spanning less than one year),
negative amortization, advance payments, increased interest rates,
prepayment penalties, and due-on-demand clauses.79 In effect, the
law prohibits many practices that are commonly associated with
predatory lenders for loans that meet the HOEPA trigger interest
rates or fee amounts.80
Despite being the strongest federal subprime lending regulation
73

See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. (2007).
See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2007).
75
See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq (2007).
76
Bagley, supra note 4, at 2280–82; See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2007).
77
Bagley, supra note 4, at 2280.
78
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a); ALVIN HARRELL, ED., TRUTH IN LENDING:
2006 SUPPLEMENT 459 (2006).
79
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d) (1994).
80
Id.
74
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in existence, the HOEPA has done little to curb predatory
lending.81 Its high triggers have enabled unscrupulous lenders to
set interest rates, fees, and points just below the HOEPA standards,
thus exempting them from having to provide HOEPA
disclosures. 82 In addition, the HOEPA fails to address ―junk fees‖83
charged by lenders and the predatory practice of rapid
refinancing.84 Lenders frequently will set their charges just below
the HOEPA triggers and then aggressively encourage borrowers to
enter into frequent, unnecessary refinances, extracting fees time
and again. 85 The borrowers receive no benefit, and the lenders
continue to profit.86
A more recent federal law, the Credit Reporting Organizations
Act (―CROA‖), enacted in 1996, applies to lenders in their
capacity as credit repair agencies. 87 The CROA is broader than
other federal lending legislation, as it prohibits ―any person‖ from
making or advising consumers to make false or misleading
statements about credit history or creditworthiness to credit
agencies and lenders or engaging in any other fraud or deception
related to their business in credit repair. 88 The Act also mandates
additional disclosures by credit repair organizations. 89 With regard
to predatory lending, it prohibits lenders or brokers that claim to be
working to improve a borrower‘s credit rating or creditworthiness
from misrepresenting that borrower‘s financial information on loan
applications.90 However, the law‘s impact is relatively limited, as it
81

Bagley, supra note 4, at 2282.
Id.
83
Junk fees are ―unnecessary costs for providing certain . . . services that
are related to, but technically independent of the mortgage itself.‖ Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 447–
51 (6th ed. 2006).
88
The Act ―only applies if the [person or] organization uses an
instrumentality of interstate commerce.‖ Id. at 449; 15 U.S.C. § 1679a (2007);
15 U.S.C. § 1679b (2007).
89
WU, supra note 87, at 456.
90
Financial information can include information such as savings, income,
or anything else that could be used to misrepresent a borrower‘s credit status. Id.
82
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only addresses falsification of creditworthiness. 91 This falsification
is difficult to prove because lenders can simply claim that they
received no documents from borrowers, and took them at their
word regarding statements of their income. 92
Finally, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (―ECOA‖) ―prohibits
treating [any loan] applicant less favorably than other applicants,‖
at any stage in the loan process, due to his or her membership in a
protected class.93 The law ostensibly constrains predatory lending
practices, which have disproportionately affected minority
homebuyers and other vulnerable communities. 94 However, by its
very nature, the ECOA requires predatory lending victims to prove
that they were targeted, rather than setting strict standards with
regard to loan terms and conditions. 95 Therefore, even though it
prohibits lenders from discriminating against minority borrowers,
it does nothing to set benchmarks with regard to interest rates or

at 459–60.
91
See 15 U.S.C. § 1679b (2007).
92
Press Release, Office of the Att‘y Gen. of Mass., Attorney General
Martha Coakley Files Lawsuit Against National Mortgage Lender-Fremont
Investment and Loan (Oct. 5, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov (Follow
Attorney General hyperlink, followed by Press Releases, and then search by
Title). So-called ―no-doc‖ loans, which require little-to-no documentation of a
borrower‘s income, are a common form of predatory mortgage.
93
DEANNE LOONIN & CHI CHI WU, CREDIT DISCRIMINATION 1, 73–74 (3d.
ed. 2002).
94
―Predatory lending campaigns occur not only in the inner-city, but also in
depressed rural areas, especially including Native American Reservations. Any
group that is traditionally underserved by mainstream lenders is vulnerable to
predatory lending. Predatory lenders also gravitate toward the elderly.‖ Peterson,
supra note 19, at 14. In 2007, a study by New York University‘s Furman Center
for Real Estate and Policy found substantial discrepancies between the
percentage of subprime loans furnished in communities of color versus
predominantly white communities. In New York City, the ten neighborhoods
with the highest concentration of subprime loans were predominantly black and
Latino, while the ten neighborhoods with the lowest concentration of these loans
were predominantly white. The study also revealed that ―even when median
income levels were comparable, home buyers in minority neighborhoods were
more likely to get a loan from a subprime lender.‖ Manny Fernandez, Study
Finds Disparity in Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A2.
95
See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2007).
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fees, and it is silent with regard to other practices used by
predatory lenders.96 Furthermore, it has been shown that, despite
the ECOA‘s existence, borrowers of color continue to be
disproportionately represented in the subprime market.97
While much of this federal regulation appears preventative on
its face, it has been deceptively ineffective. 98 Although the TILA
mandates disclosures, the disclosures are often difficult to read and
understand, and consumers sometimes do not know they have a
right to cancel their transactions. 99 Also, the HOEPA‘s triggers are
set so high that, despite the law‘s ability to prevent multiple
predatory practices, lenders can easily evade the act by setting their
interest rates and fees just below the trigger amounts.100
Furthermore, the CROA is limited to only one element of
predatory lending—falsification of creditworthiness—which is
often avoidable.101 Finally, regardless of addressing the
discrimination element, the ECOA has been shown to be
ineffective through the continuing disproportionate effect of
predatory lending on communities of color.102
D. State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws and Preemption
In response to ineffective federal laws, multiple states have
passed laws to combat unscrupulous lending. 103 In 1999, North
Carolina started the trend by passing a law similar to the HOEPA
that prohibited various predatory contract provisions and sales
practices.104 However, the law set the trigger for fees lower than

96

Id.
See Fernandez, supra note 94.
98
Miller, supra note 9, at 3–4.
99
See id.; See also 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2007).
100
Miller, supra note 9, at 3–4.
101
15 U.S.C. § 1679b (2007).
102
Reiss, supra note 20, at 997.
103
As of 2004, twenty-five states had passed anti-predatory lending laws.
Peterson, supra note 19, at 5. In addition, twelve cities passed laws of their own
combating the practice. Id.
104
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1A-10.2 (2003).
97
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those of the federal act and included additional prohibitions. 105
Numerous states followed suit, 106 and many municipalities
developed their own similar ordinances. 107 State laws in response
to predatory lending have been touted as highly effective, as states
have been better able to innovate and respond to constituents and
local needs. 108
However, due to an outcry from the lending industry, the
federal government has undercut such regulation by issuing
statements declaring that federal banking law preempts state action
with regard to federally-chartered, FDIC-insured banks.109
Beginning in 2003, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
(―OCC‖), a federal agency, issued a series of orders preempting
various state predatory lending statutes as applied to national
banks, despite the vigorous objection of State Attorneys General
across the country.110 This preemption has prevented states from
developing new legislation and utilizing creative solutions to stop
the scourge of predatory lending. 111 Consequently, aside from state
consumer protection acts and fraud claims, states and consumers
generally have been forced to depend on federal legislation. 112
105

See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (1994); § 24-1.1A-10.2; Peterson, supra note 19,
at 62–63. The North Carolina Predatory Lending Act of 1999 prohibited
practices such as balloon payments, negative amortization and others, but unlike
HOEPA, it set its fee trigger at five percent, as opposed to HOEPA‘s eight
percent. Peterson, supra note 19, at 62–63. It maintained an interest rate trigger
of ten percent above the rate on comparable U.S. Treasury securities. Id. In
addition, unlike HOEPA, it prohibited rapid refinancing and furnishing loans
without regard to a borrower‘s ability to repay. Id.
106
―Indiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Massachusetts . . .
all adopted strong predatory lending laws echoing the North Carolina approach.‖
Id. at 65–66. Georgia passed a strong law and then repealed it, and multiple
other states have passed anti-predatory lending and consumer protection laws
that ostensibly protect consumers, but are not nearly as strong. Id. at 65–67.
107
Peterson, supra note 19, at 64–65.
108
Azmy, supra note 25, at 5.
109
Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71.
110
The OCC claimed that ―state laws do not apply to national banks
whenever they ‗obstruct, impair, or condition‘ the ability of national banks to
engage in consumer lending.‖ Id. at 70.
111
See id.
112
See id.
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Therefore, due to weak federal regulation and preemption of state
laws, states and others interested in combating predatory lending
have had to utilize other methods to prevent unethical lending
practices.113 The primary method has been in the form of suits filed
by state Attorneys General on behalf of aggrieved consumers. 114
II. STATE ACTION AND ATTORNEY GENERAL-DIRECTED LAWSUITS
Federal preemption of state predatory lending laws has left
states with few options. 115 In response, state Attorneys General
have filed numerous lawsuits against large predatory lenders, often
relying on state unfair and deceptive acts and practices (―UDAP‖)
laws and fraud claims. 116
A. The Household Finance and Ameriquest Suits
In December 2002, Tom Miller, the Iowa Attorney General and
Chair of the Subprime Lending Committee of the National
Association of Attorneys General, along with the Attorneys
General of every other state, reached a settlement with Household
Finance Corporation and Beneficial Corporation (―Household‖), a
subprime, predatory lender.117 Under the terms of the settlement,
113

Id.
See infra notes 117–55 and accompanying text.
115
Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71.
116
See infra notes 117–55 and accompanying text.
117
Press Release, Office of the Iowa Att‘y. Gen., Miller: All Fifty States
Join Settlement with Household Finance (Dec. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.org/latest_news/releases/dec_2002/hhold.html.
This settlement between the State of Iowa and Household Finance is
substantially the same as settlements between Household and the forty-nine
other states and the District of Columbia. Id. The settlement identified numerous
predatory practices by Household, including but not limited to the following:
interest rates, points and origination fees, monthly payment amounts, balloon
payments, prepayment penalties, limited documentation, and rapid refinancing
without benefit to the consumer. Id. In Iowa, the State‘s suit was based upon the
claim that Household had violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, Iowa Code
Sec. 714.16. Settlement Consent Agreement 4,
available at
http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.org/latest_news/releases/dec_2002/hhconsent.p
114
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Household agreed to pay out $484 million to aggrieved consumers
across the country. 118 However, while Household paid hundreds of
millions of dollars into a restitution fund, defrauded borrowers
received minimal proceeds. 119 Often, victims of predatory lending
are thousands of dollars in debt, so the restitution received by each
victim in the Household settlement was likely only a fraction of the
amount owed.120
However, in addition to the settlement fund set up by
Household,121 the settlement called for restitution of some
prepayment penalties paid by consumers 122 and multiple forms of
injunctive relief. 123 After this suit, Household‘s lender fees were
limited to five percent of the loan principal, 124 and the lender had
to provide disclosure regarding calculation of points, interest rates,

df (last visited July 27, 2008).
118
Miller: All Fifty States Join Settlement Agreement, supra note 117.
119
Press Release, Office of the Iowa Att‘y. Gen., 1.5 Million on its Way to
Household Finance Customers (Dec. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.org/latest_news/releases/dec_2003/household.h
tml. For example, Iowa received approximately $1.5 million of the $484 million
restitution fund. Id. However, this was split among 2,886 households, such that
most Household borrowers in Iowa received between $100 and $500 in
restitution, and no borrower received more than $5,768. Id.
120
Gretchen Morgenson, Can These Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2007, at C1. Frequently, predatory lending victims have fallen behind
on their loans by thousands of dollars. Id. For example, Sharon Rivas-Spivey, a
borrower from southern New Jersey, has seen her $141,000 loan increase to over
$196,000 due to rising interest, late fees and other charges. Id. Jane Connor, a
Massachusetts borrower, owes over $550,000 for a loan on which she owed
approximately $442,000 when she went into default. Id. These borrowers, who
both received loans from Countrywide Mortgage, are not uncommon. Id.
121
The money paid by Household would primarily be distributed via an
interest-bearing trust administered in California by the Office of the California
Attorney General, and through other settlement accounts for states not
participating in this fund. See Settlement Consent Agreement, supra note 117, at
7.
122
Id. at 9–10.
123
Id. at 10–20.
124
Id. at 11. These fees are referring to ―loan origination charges, Discount
Points, or both.‖ Id.
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and balloon payments.125 Further, Household had to provide a
good faith estimate of all charges to be incurred by a potential
borrower, no later than three days after the prospective borrower‘s
application had been delivered, and could not represent its interest
rates or any loan terms in a ―deceptive manner.‖126 In addition,
Household was prohibited from charging prepayment penalties on
any loans (without making disclosures), charging discount points
or origination fees on any mortgages that had been refinanced or
originated by Household in the previous twelve months, and
selling credit insurance on mortgages.127 Borrowers had the right to
cancel all open-ended lines of credit furnished by Household at any
time.128
While the restitutionary funds provided for consumers in the
Household settlement were minimal, the injunctive relief secured
by the states was substantial, as it limited Household‘s ability to
use deceptive practices and charge exorbitant rates to unwitting
consumers.129 However, the settlement and its injunctive
provisions only applied to Household, and numerous other
predatory lenders continued to prey upon homeowners throughout
the country.
Following the Household case, forty-nine state Attorneys
General and the Attorney General of the District of Columbia
followed suit and in 2006, instituted proceedings against
Ameriquest, another large subprime lender. 130 This suit netted
$325 million, with $295 million going to the lender‘s victims and
$30 million paying for legal costs.131 Like the Household
settlement, the Ameriquest settlement called for injunctive relief,
125

Id.
Id. at 11–12.
127
Id. at 16–17.
128
Id. at 15.
129
See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text.
130
Press Release, State of N.Y. Banking Dep‘t, Banking Department Joins
Regulators and Law Enforcement Officials from 48 Other States in Announcing
Settlement Agreement With Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Jan. 23, 2006),
available at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr060123.htm.
131
Ameriquest to Pay $325 Million in a Settlement Over Lending, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at C1.
126
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requiring Ameriquest to provide the same interest rates and
discount points for ―similarly-situated consumers,‖ to eliminate the
use of incentives for employees to charge consumers extra fees or
prepayment penalties, to provide full disclosure of the cost and
terms of the loan, to provide accurate, good-faith estimates, to limit
prepayment penalties on adjustable rate mortgages, and to institute
many other changes to the company practice. 132 However, state
officials have also engaged in other activities, aside from suing
major lenders, in an effort to stop predatory lending.133
B. More State Action and the Push for Substantive Change
A developing trend is state agencies suing other lenders, such
as Delta Financial, 134 Advantage Mortgage Service,135 and First
Alliance Mortgage Company. 136 However, each of these suits has
led to a settlement that applies only to the specific lender that was
sued. As a result, there has not been industry-wide change, since
settlements bind only the parties involved, and do not establish
precedent.
State Attorneys General and other state officials have

132

See Press Release, State of N.Y. Banking Dep‘t, supra note 130.
See infra notes 134–55 and accompanying text.
134
Delta Financial Corporation settled for $1.65 million in 2002, with
$500,000 going to defrauded consumers. Joseph P. Fried, Home Lender Offers
to Settle Claims of Predatory Practices, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at B3.
135
The State of Nebraska sued Advantage Mortgage Services, a mortgage
lender, for violation of ―Nebraska‘s Mortgage Bankers Registration and
Licensing Act, the Consumer Protection Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.‖ Nelson Lampe, Nebraska Sues Mortgage Broker for Predatory
Lending,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
15,
2007),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2007-09-14-nebraskamortgage-suit_N.htm. Advantage originates more than $100 million in loans per
year. Id.
136
Minnesota successfully sued First Alliance in 1999 for its ―teaser‖
ARMs, which led Minnesota consumers to purchase unaffordable loans. Lori
Swanson, Att. Gen., St. of Minn., Testimony to the Board of Governors of the
Federal
Reserve
System
(June
14,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/Consumer/SwansonTestimonyFederal%20Reser
ve.pdf.
133
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continued to take actions designed to combat lending abuses. 137 In
addition to suing predatory lenders, they have pushed for federal
legislative change and regulation to prevent mass foreclosure. 138 A
task force, led by Miller and comprised of Attorneys General and
banking regulators from ten states, has begun working to ―persuade
mortgage-servicing companies and investors in mortgage-backed
securities to increase the number of troubled subprime loans they
restructure, to stem the tide of foreclosures.‖ 139 The task force is
working with banks to collaboratively address skyrocketing rates
of foreclosure, pursuing this new tactic in lieu of enforcement
actions.140
In addition, the task force is pushing for federal legislative
action. 141 In August 2007, Miller addressed the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, and argued that HOEPA should be amended
to incorporate various regulations to prohibit numerous ―unfair and
deceptive practices.‖142 Building upon the success of the
Household and Ameriquest suits, Miller claimed that the
settlements helped state governments develop the expertise
necessary to stop predatory lending, and led the lenders to establish
better practices that had been adopted by others in the mortgage
industry.143 He emphasized that the Federal Reserve Board was in
a unique position to address the preemption issue and develop
regulations that would apply to all members of the mortgage
lending community and establish uniform standards of conduct.144

137

See infra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
139
Ruth Simon, Task Force Will Seek More Loan Revisions, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 8, 2007, at A3.
140
Id.
141
Press Release, Iowa Office of the Att‘y. Gen., Iowa Attorney General
Tom Miller Comments to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors on Adopting
Regulations to Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices under the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) (August 14, 2007),
available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/aug_
2007/Fed_reserve_hoepa.html.
142
Id.
143
Miller, supra note 9.
144
Id. at 2.
138
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Additionally, Miller echoed the sentiment that HOEPA, in its
present form, has been somewhat useful, but overall ineffective
because it has only applied to the limited category of ―high-cost‖
loans.145 He stated, ―[a]fter all, the problems [that] the States
uncovered in the Household and Ameriquest cases did not involve
high cost loans (as defined under HOEPA), but regular subprime
loans.‖146 In addition, he acknowledged that existing disclosure
documents provided to consumers were inadequate, but that
improved disclosures alone would not suffice to stop predatory
lending.147 Miller also argued for a new underwriting standard for
subprime loans, based upon the borrower‘s ability to repay the
loan, instead of his or her ability to pay off low teaser rates on
adjustable rate mortgages and the possibility of market
appreciation. 148 Further, he suggested prohibiting prepayment
penalties for subprime loans149 and other concessions from the
mortgage industry. 150
145

Id. at 3.
Id.
147
―No matter how good the disclosure, it will always be subject to
misrepresentations, omissions, and downright lying by a loan originator who has
every incentive to close the loan. Subprime originators have a propensity to
engage in deception and misrepresentations which undermine even the best
disclosures.‖ Id. at 4.
148
A teaser rate is an introductory interest rate that adjusts upward rapidly
as part of an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). Investopedia.com, available at
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/teaserrate.asp. Low teaser rates often get
homebuyers into homes, but make foreclosure almost inevitable. While market
appreciation will make the house easier to sell for greater value in the future, it
will not help a homeowner make his or her monthly mortgage payments. In
order to make payments, homeowners frequently have to refinance, often ending
up in more oppressive loans. See Miller, supra note 9, at 4–7.
149
Miller, supra note 9, at 8–9.
150
These additional requests included requiring escrow accounts for taxes
and insurance, as lenders frequently leave taxes and insurance out of their
monthly payment quotes to borrowers, leading them to believe payments will be
lower than they actually are. Id. at 9. This is especially prevalent on loan
transactions in which a borrower is refinancing a current loan and consolidating
debt into a mortgage. Id. Miller also suggested restrictions on ―low-doc‖ loans,
which frequently allow lenders to furnish unaffordable loans, as lenders can
claim they furnished the loan based on the borrower‘s stated income and no
146
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In addition to the actions of Miller and the task force, other
state officials have similarly pushed for change in how lenders
relate to investors who purchase mortgages on the secondary
market.151 Since securitization has eliminated much of the risk of
loss for subprime lenders and has eliminated the risk of liability for
both lenders and investors,152 policymakers have called for its
regulation.153
These combined tactics, by which state officials have worked
with banks while pushing for legislative change, are built upon the
litigation strategy previously used by the states, and are being used
to supplement the impact of the litigation. This new strategy seems
tailored to fit the current foreclosure crisis and the numerous
parties involved in and affected by it.
State-directed lawsuits alone were not effective at creating
systemic change and reforming the entire subprime market.154
However, they were the best tool available to fight predatory
lenders, given the then-existing federal laws and their preemption
of state legislative action.155 In addition, they provided valuable
information and lessons to state officials, enabling officials to
make well-grounded policy recommendations to the federal
government and to work with the industry itself to combat abusive

additional documentation, Id. at 10–11. Further, he recommends prohibition of
future promises to refinance, as these frequently are made to convince borrowers
who have discovered a ―bait-and-switch‖ at closing to enter bad loans, thinking
they will soon refinance into a better one that never actually happens. Id. at 12.
Miller‘s comments supported those made to the Federal Reserve Board by
Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson, when in June 2007, she argued for
aggressive enforcement and expansion of HOEPA and against federal
preemption of state consumer protection laws. Swanson, supra note 136, at 3–6.
151
See, e.g., Madigan, supra note 38, at 5–6.
152
Investors have generally not been held liable for the actions of a loan
originator, and once the originator sells the loan through securitization, the
originator‘s risk of loss is gone, because it has been paid in full by investors.
Therefore, subprime lenders are far more willing to engage in predatory
practices and furnish unaffordable loans, as all risk of default is passed along to
the secondary market. Id. at 5–6.
153
Id. at 9–11.
154
See supra notes 117–33 and accompanying text.
155
See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71.
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practices.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE STATE ATTORNEYS‘ GENERAL ACTION
While the suits against individual lenders exerted limited
systemic impact, they have provided a framework and an
opportunity for developing broad policy change in the future.
A. The Influence of the Banking Industry
The banking industry, including the mortgage lending industry,
has wielded important influence over politicians in both major
parties through its political donations and support of candidates.156
Providing substantial financial support for politicians and parties
can buy an industry significant influence over legislation and
federal policy. 157 Since 1990, the mortgage industry has donated
over $45 million to federal politicians, with fifty-six percent going
to Republicans and forty-four percent to Democrats.158 Also, since
1990, the securities and investment sector, which is closely tied to
the mortgage industry due to securitization, has contributed $473
156

See Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/
industries/indus.asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
157
This effect has been demonstrated by the tobacco industry and its
ongoing lobbying efforts. See Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco Industry
Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 902, BULL. OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 78.7 (July 2000). According to the World Health Organization,
throughout its history, the tobacco industry used multiple methods to block
legislation hostile to its interests. Prominent among these methods was buying
influence through gifts to politicians, such as ―dinners and tickets to sports
events like the Indianapolis 500.‖ Id. at 905. This was in addition to political
donations and other financial contributions. In 1998, in the United States alone,
the industry spent over $43 million on lobbying against federal anti-tobacco
legislation. Id. at 906.
158
This amount includes both soft money and hard money contributions,
according to opensecrets.org, the website of the Center for Responsive Politics,
which tracks political donations from individuals, companies, and industrial
sectors. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/
indus.asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008). During the 2004 election
cycle, the industry provided close to $8 million in political contributions, with
64 percent going to Republicans and the rest to Democrats. Id.
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million to both major parties, with fifty-one percent going to
Republicans and forty-eight percent to Democrats.159 Due to the
political power inherent in the banking industry, this continuing
influence will remain an inhibiting force on any type of federal
reform on the mortgage banking industry. 160
B. Valuable Lessons for the Future
Despite the power of the mortgage industry and the securities
sector, state officials have been able to glean multiple important
lessons from their prior efforts, which have informed more recent
action and will likely continue to do so going forward. Prior to the
burst of the housing bubble and the collapse of the subprime
market, state-directed lawsuits led by the Attorneys General were
the only feasible actions that could be taken. 161 The states
attempted to stop large predatory lenders by using consumer
protection and fraud statutes, since these were the few weapons
that were at their disposal. 162 While this strategy established little
substantive change and provided only minimal compensation for
victims, Attorneys General were successful in changing certain
practices of one major predatory lender, Ameriquest, and virtually
shut down another lender, Household.163 HSBC, which purchased
Household, now funds the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition‘s ―Consumer Rescue Fund,‖ which provides low-interest

159

Ctr. for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.
asp?Ind=F07 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
160
Stephen Labaton, Loan Industry Fighting Rules on Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008, at A1.
161
Federal preemption of state law eliminated states‘ abilities to develop
comprehensive anti-predatory lending statutes, Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–
71. Therefore, state Attorneys General brought suits on behalf of victimized
borrowers based on state UDAP statutes. Complaint against Household
Fin.Corp., Of. of the Iowa Att‘y. Gen., available at http://www.state.ia.us/
government/ag/latest_news/releases/dec_2002/hhpetition.pdf.
162
Id.
163
Household Finance was purchased by HSBC in 2003, which settled its
above-mentioned lawsuit. Julia Werdigier, Two Executives Are Ousted at HSBC,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C1.
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loans for victims of predatory lending. 164 This is a positive
development for aggrieved borrowers—with the federal
government hesitant to provide support for subprime borrowers
over the past several years,165 this was the best result for which
anti-predatory lending advocates could have hoped.
Nonetheless, predatory lending has continued to thrive through
a large network of lenders, brokers, and other unscrupulous real
estate professionals. 166 Lenders provide ―yield spread premiums,‖
which are special bonuses to brokers who steer consumers into
more expensive loans.167 In addition, lenders sometimes bring
lawyers to closings, who purportedly represent the borrowers‘
interests.168 Instead, these lawyers frequently serve the interest of
the brokers or lenders, and the borrowers rarely have the chance to
read through their loan documents at that time. 169 Further,
164

Sue Kirchhoff, More U.S. Home Buyers Fall Prey To Predatory
Lending, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/perfi/housing/2004-12-06-subprime-predatory-lending_x.htm.
The
Consumer Rescue Fund, developed by the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition, was developed to prevent homeowners, facing foreclosure, from
losing their homes. It provides multiple forms of support for victims of
predatory lending, including mediation with the lender or holder of the loan to
eliminate abusive loan terms, refinancing into a fair, affordable loan through the
lender or servicer, or, in some cases, forgiving unaffordable portions of the loan.
The Consumer Rescue Fund provides refinancing services in seventeen states.
NCRC Consumer Rescue Fund, www.fairlending.com (last visited Sept. 24,
2008) (providing a more in-depth description of the Consumer Rescue Fund and
its terms and conditions).
165
The federal government has undercut state attempts to protect
consumers via federal preemption of state predatory lending laws. See Peterson,
supra note 19, at 70–71.
166
Bajaj, supra note 60. Frequently, predatory lenders will work with
attorneys, title companies, brokers, and other professionals who use unethical
tactics to steer borrowers toward inflated, bogus charges and unaffordable loans.
Telephone Interview with Margaret Becker, Dir., Foreclosure Prevention Unit at
Legal Services for N.Y. City – Staten Island, (Dec. 4, 2007), hereinafter ―Becker
Interview‖. See generally ELIZABETH RENUART, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A
GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES (2002).
167
Peterson, supra note 19, at 16–17.
168
Becker Interview, supra note 166
169
Id.
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predatory lenders often work with title agencies that charge
inflated prices and bogus fees for their services. 170
C. Out of Crisis Comes an Opportunity for Change
The collapse of the subprime market and rapidly increasing
rates of foreclosure have appeared prominently in the news
throughout 2007 and 2008.171 Predatory lending‘s impact is
affecting a segment of America beyond subprime borrowers,
including investors, the media, the political sector, and the public
at-large.172 At this time, there is a unique opportunity to develop
substantive change at both the state and federal level, based upon
the prior successes of the State Attorneys General in pursuing
predatory lenders and attempting to change their practices. 173
i. The Ripple Effect of a Collapsing Industry
The casualties of the subprime industry did not end with
Ameriquest or Household. Instead, the collapsing subprime
industry has contributed to a nationwide economic downturn.174
Countrywide Mortgage was a major casualty in the ―subprime
crisis.‖175 As of September 7, 2007, the lender had announced
plans to cut 12,000 of its approximately 60,000 employees, nearly
20 percent of its workforce.176 Countrywide has been an influential
party in subprime lending, with numerous accusations of predatory

170

Id. From personal experience at Legal Services for New York City –
Staten Island during the summer of 2007, I observed loan documents outlining
charges for numerous predatory loans. On these documents, I saw the same title
agencies appear time and again, charging high fees to clients and repeatedly
doing business with predatory lenders. Id.
171
See sources cited supra note 1.
172
See discussion infra notes 174–89 and accompanying text.
173
See discussion supra notes 115–55 and accompanying text.
174
Peter S. Goodman & Floyd Norris, No Quick Fix to Downturn, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at A1.
175
Eric Dash, Countrywide Plans to Cut Staff Deeply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2007, at C1.
176
Id.
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activity. 177 In April 2007, Countrywide settled with the State of
Connecticut for $500,000 because of its predatory practices.178
More recently, based upon its exposure to 80,000 potential
foreclosures due to resetting interest rates on ARMs, Countrywide
has agreed to refinance up to $16 billion in loans.179 As of October
2007, 450,000 of the nine million loans serviced by Countrywide
were at least a month late on payments, and at least 80,000 were
facing foreclosure.180 Countrywide serves as an example of a largescale subprime lender whose engagement in predatory lending has
harmed the company itself, forcing it to refinance billions of
dollars in loans and lay off thousands of workers. 181 Countrywide‘s
collapse serves to illustrate the impact predatory lending has had
on not just borrowers, but on workers, renters,182 and investors as
well. 183 By engaging in unscrupulous practices, Countrywide has
177

See Bob Tedeschi, When State Laws Do Not Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2007, at RE11.
178
Id.
179
Countrywide had identified 80,000 potential borrowers who had been
able to make payments at their current interest rates, but were scheduled to face
a rate adjustment that would make their loans unaffordable. Countrywide Offers
Help
for
Reset
Shock,
CNNMoney.com,
Oct.
23,
2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/23/news/companies/countrywide_default_progra
m/. According to Countrywide, 52,000 of these customers, representing
approximately $10 billion in loans, will qualify for either prime rate loans or
loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (―FHA‖). Id. An
additional 20,000 borrowers, currently meeting payments, but with more severe
credit problems, could receive other loan modifications totaling $4 billion
dollars. Id.
180
Id.
181
See Dash, supra note 175.
182
In addition to the subprime collapse‘s impact on employees at
Countrywide, renters have faced eviction from properties in foreclosure. See
Dash, supra note 175. For example, in Nevada, 28 percent of foreclosed-upon
properties were home to renters, as were 22 percent of foreclosed-upon
properties in California. Thus, these individuals, who never interacted directly
with a predatory lender or broker, are feeling the unfortunate effects of mass
foreclosure. John Leland, As Owners Feel Mortgage Pain, So Do Renters, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1; see also Kelly Evans, Mortgage Turmoil Hits
Renters, WALL ST. J., at D1, Oct. 11, 2007.
183
Some hedge funds and other investment firms have faced huge losses,
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put a massive number of people at risk.
The crises faced by Countrywide and other lenders have
increasingly caused market-wide problems throughout the United
States economy. 184 In addition, the mortgage crisis has hurt renters,
as landlords have fallen behind on mortgage payments and faced
foreclosure.185 Recently, additional important actors in the
subprime industry have faced similar fates, and the impact has
even spread to more traditional lenders. 186 In the summer of 2008,
government-supported mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac had to rely on a federal bail-out, due to a downward spiral in
the economy. 187 Further, the general public has faced significant
financial losses due to investment in subprime loans, 188 as have
major American banks. 189
ii.

An Opportunity for Discussion and Ideas for the Future

The subprime crisis has finally forced state and federal officials
to consider the importance of preventing foreclosure and the abuse
and have even filed for bankruptcy, based on losses due to investment in the
subprime market. See Associated Press, Judge Rejects Bankruptcy for Two
Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C4; see also Bloomberg News,
Holding of Debt Securities Falls Again at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007,
at C5.
184
Bank of America, for example, reported that, ―net income fell 32
percent, as it set aside an additional $865 million for credit losses and
announced that loans that have gone bad rose by nearly $1 billion.‖ Countrywide
Offers Help for Reset Shock, supra note 179.
185
Evans, supra note 182.
186
Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game – What Will Mac ‘n’ Mae Cost You
and Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at BU1.
187
Id.
188
See supra notes 182–84.
189
For example, Citigroup announced the departure of its Chairman and
CEO as it faced potential writedowns (reductions in the book value of
overvalued assets) of up to $11 million. Citigroup’s Day of Reckoning,
CNNMoney.com, Nov. 4, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/04/news/
companies/citigroup_prince/. Less than a week earlier, the CEO of Merrill
Lynch also resigned, due to severe losses stemming from investments in the
subprime market. David Ellis, O’Neal Out at Merrill, CNNMoney.com, Oct. 31,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/30/news/companies/merrill_oneal/.
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of borrowers and investors by subprime lenders and the
organizations with whom they do business. 190 The federal
government has seized this opportunity, leveraging knowledge
gained from state-directed lawsuits and other strategies around
predatory lending to develop new legislation aimed at combating
abusive lending practices. 191 In particular, Congress has recently
been pushing the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act of 2007, also known as House Bill 3915, 192 a bill designed to
regulate subprime lenders and to prevent the abuses that have
injured consumers and affected the entire market. 193 Most notably,
the bill mandates that lenders not furnish loans without regard to a
borrower‘s ability to repay. 194 It also addresses disclosures, yield
spread premiums, and various other tactics used by predatory
lenders. 195 In addition, it deals with elements of predatory lending
190

See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Enron’s Second Coming?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2007, at A25.
191
See Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2007, at A24; see also Miller, supra note 9, at 1.
192
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. Res.
3915, 110th Cong. (2007). According to the office of Congressman Christopher
Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut, the bill (among other things):
1) Establishes a federal duty of care, prohibits steering, and calls for
licensing and registration of mortgage originators, including brokers
and bank loan officers; 2) Sets a minimum standard for all mortgages
which states that borrowers must have a reasonable ability to repay; 3)
Attaches limited liability to secondary market securitizers who package
and sell interest in home mortgage loans outside of these standards.
However, individual investors in these securities would not be liable;
and 4) Expands and enhances consumer protections for ―high-cost
loans‖ under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and
includes important protections for renters of foreclosed homes.
Press Release, Office of Representative Christopher Murphy, Murphy
Successful in Moving Mortgage Kickback Prohibition Bill, October 23, 2007,
available at http://chrismurphy.house.gov/ (follow ―latest news,‖ hyperlink; then
follow hyperlink for Oct. 23, 2007).
193
Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, supra note 191.
194
Id.
195
House Bill 3915 § 129A establishes a general standard of care to be
followed by lenders, and lists mandatory disclosures. H.R. Res. 3915 § 129A.
Section 123 of this resolution prohibits yield spread premiums based upon the
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that are ignored by existing statutes, such as TILA and HOEPA. 196
Further, it explicitly prevents federal preemption of state banking
laws.197
Notwithstanding these characteristics, the bill provides only
limited means for redress for aggrieved consumers. 198 A major
example of this is the bill‘s treatment of assignee (secondarymarket investor) liability. 199 With regard to companies who
terms of the loan and other forms of ―steering‖ consumers towards higher-cost
loans. H.R. Res. 3915 § 123. Section 103 sets forth licensing and registration
regulations for lenders. H.R. Res. 3915 § 103. This federal regulation is directly
in line with Attorney General Miller‘s request for federal intervention, based
upon his experience in the Ameriquest suit and his involvement with the tenstate task force. See generally Miller, supra note 9.
196
TILA purely addresses disclosures, See 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2008).
HOEPA does not address junk fees, rapid refinancing, or furnishing loans
without regard to repayment ability. Bagley, supra note 4 at 2282. House Bill
3915 closes these loopholes. See H.R. Res. 3915, § 201 et. seq. (2007)
197
See H.R. Res. 3915 § 208(b) (2007). The statute does indicate that TILA
supersedes any state law with which it conflicts. See H.R. Res. 3915 § 208(a).
However, Section 208(b) states that, aside from that one provision, the law in no
way limits the states from applying any state law against a creditor, assignee or
securitizer. H.R. Res. 3915 § 208(b) (2008).
198
Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007,
at A28.
199
The Act provides that aggrieved borrowers can receive only limited
remedies from securitizers, including rescission of the loan and all costs that
occur in conjunction with this rescission, including attorney‘s fees. However,
the securitizer can remain exempt from all liability if it cures the mortgage‘s
flaws or if the following conditions are met:
(i) The assignee [or securitizer] -(I) has a policy against buying residential mortgage loans
other than qualified mortgages or qualified safe harbor
mortgages (as defined in subsection (c)); and
(II) exercises reasonable due diligence to adhere to such policy
in purchasing residential mortgage loans through adequate,
thorough, and consistently applied sampling procedures
established in accordance which regulations which the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation shall jointly prescribe.
(ii) The contract under which such assignee acquired the residential
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purchase loans on the secondary market, aggrieved borrowers can
only have the loan rescinded and receive restitution for any costs
incurred dealing with this rescission. 200 Furthermore, assignees and
securitizers are even protected from this limited liability if they
meet certain conditions—namely that they have policies and
practices in place that prevent the furnishing of unaffordable
mortgages.201 This limitation on liability leaves borrowers virtually
powerless once their loans have been securitized and sold, because
there is no legal mechanism to force secondary-market actors to
behave ethically with regard to purchasing loans. 202
Unfortunately, in addition to these substantial limitations,
Congress has proposed amendments to H.R. 3915 that weakened it
further.203 One such amendment would eliminate any means for
redress under the law at the state level, rendering the section
preventing federal preemption of state predatory lending regulation
functionally meaningless.204 Much of the blame has been placed on
the banking industry‘s influence on both parties in Congress, as the
banking industry has extensive lobbying power and the ability to
donate large sums to candidates.205 Despite these weaknesses,
though, H.R. 3915 still remains a tougher federal anti-predatory
lending law than those that are already in existence. 206 While the

mortgage loan from a seller or assignor of the loan contains
representations and warranties that the seller or assignor-(I) will not sell or assign any residential mortgage loan which
is not a qualified mortgage or a qualified safe harbor
mortgage; or
(II) is a beneficiary of a representation and warranty from a
previous seller or assignor to that effect, and the assignee in
good faith takes reasonable steps to obtain the benefit of such
representation or warranty.
H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007) § 204.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
The only risk is the risk of rescission. Id.
203
Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, supra note 198.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
See supra notes 62–102 and accompanying text.
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resolution is evidence that the federal government is at least
considering taking a small step to protect borrowers, that
protection will not arrive until the bill passes the Senate.207
iii. Potential Solutions
There are a wide range of potential options for preventing
predatory lending in the future and rectifying the lending abuses
that have already occurred. While H.R. 3915, in its original form,
addressed some of the suggestions of Attorney General Miller and
his task force,208 there are still additional means to address abuses
in the subprime market. These options include: (1) more
comprehensive federal policy change;209 (2) allowing states more
leeway in developing their own anti-predatory lending programs
and statutes;210 (3) Attorneys General continuing to pursue abuses
in the subprime market, focusing on rating agencies in addition to
lenders;211 and (4) campaign finance reform, curbing the banking
industry‘s influence on the political process. 212
There is ample opportunity and desire for change at the federal
level. 213 As evidenced by the development of H.R. 3915 and the
207

GovTrack.us, H.R. 3915: Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act of 2007, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1103915 (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
208
Miller has suggested more stringent regulations that would apply to a
broader class of loans than the HOEPA; that merely improved disclosure
standards would not be enough to prevent predatory lending; that loans should
be furnished based upon a standard for a borrower‘s ability to repay; that
prepayment penalties should be eliminated; and other policy recommendations.
See Miller, supra note 9, at 1. H.R. 3915 has adopted many of these
recommendations, but has failed to provide necessary enforcement mechanisms,
particularly with regard to secondary-market investor liability See H.R 3915;
supra note 199 and accompanying text.
209
See infra notes 213–25 and accompanying text.
210
See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71.
211
See infra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
212
See Editorial, Candidates Bungle With Bundlers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2007, at 8.
213
See Murphy, supra note 192; see also Press Release, Office of
Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Tubbs Jones Releases Statement in
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high levels of publicity associated with the Ameriquest and
Household suits, 214 the public has finally recognized the need for
strict federal laws to regulate subprime lenders.215 The federal
government has attempted to make some policy changes based
upon Attorney General Miller‘s suggestions. 216 Most notably, H.R.
3915 extends some liability to purchasers on the secondary market
for the first time. 217 This is especially important in the case of
hedge funds that purchase wholesale bundles of loans that are
designed to fail. 218 Unfortunately, the statute lacks teeth due to
limitations in its securitizer/assignee liability provision.219 The
provision fails to provide either a strong incentive to prevent
originators who plan to pass on their loans to the secondary market
from furnishing unaffordable mortgages, or a real incentive to
prevent secondary-market assignees and securitizers from
purchasing unaffordable, predatory loans. 220 Still, H.R. 3915 does
set some higher standards for lending practices, bans several
common predatory practices for loan originators,221 and ends much
of the practice of federal preemption. 222 Far from a perfect
solution, H.R. 3915 thus provides a modest improvement from
previously existing anti-predatory lending enforcement
mechanisms.
Another way to address abuses in the subprime market is for
Congress to enact legislation that would provide states with the
necessary leeway to establish their own predatory lending laws. 223

Support of Mortgage Reform, Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation, Nov. 15,
2007, available at http://tubbsjones.house.gov/.
214
See supra notes 117–33 and accompanying text.
215
See Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, supra note 191.
216
See supra notes 141–50 and accompanying text.
217
See H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. § 204 (2007).
218
Madigan, supra note 38, at 7–8.
219
See H.R. Res. 3915 § 204 (2007).
220
Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, supra note 198; see also
Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, supra note 191.
221
See supra notes 194–97; H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. § 129A, 123, 201
et. seq (2007).
222
See H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. § 208(b) (2007).
223
See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
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Previous state laws were far more demanding on abusive lenders
than federal statutes, and served to deter lenders from preying on
vulnerable populations.224 However, federal preemption of state
laws radically diminished their efficacy and allowed predatory
lenders to flourish.225 Therefore, cutting off preemption would
provide states with the ability to react to problems and develop the
necessary laws that would appeal to their constituents and serve
consumers.
Attorneys General also have the means to combat problems in
the subprime market. They could expand their existing strategy of
suing lenders to take legal action against the rating agencies that
have made investments in bundled subprime loans appear safe.226
Rating agencies, which are responsible for assessing the risk of
investments,227 allegedly downplayed the risk of securitized loans.
This decision resulted in leading additional investors purchasing
them without fully understanding their instability and high
likelihood of default.228 States are already beginning to act,
investigating the three major ratings agencies: Moody‘s, Standard
and Poor‘s, and Fitch Ratings.229 These agencies allegedly gave
unduly positive ratings to securitized mortgage investments in
exchange for payment from the issuer of the investment.230 By
investigating, banning, and prosecuting these practices, the federal
government and the states would force the ratings agencies to give
accurate, honest assessments of the risk of securitized loans, thus
discouraging investors from investing in bundled predatory

224

Id.
See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
226
See Krugman, supra note 190 (holding ratings agencies partially
responsible for the mortgage crisis, allowing predatory loans to flourish and be
easily sold in the secondary market).
227
―Investment banks and other financial institutions, which issue trillions
of dollars in various types of debt for sale to investors, depend upon ratings from
the agencies to sell their paper. The ratings rank creditworthiness and the ability
of the issuer to repay investors.‖ Lynnley Browning, Connecticut Investigates
Major Debt-Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at C4.
228
Krugman, supra note 190.
229
Browning, supra note 227.
230
Id.
225
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mortgages.231 From this, it could be inferred that regulation and
prosecution of the ratings agencies would indirectly limit predatory
lenders‘ ability to sell their loans on the secondary market,
ultimately drying up their business.
Finally, campaign finance reform could play a very strong role
in preventing predatory lending. The banking industry has
contributed millions of dollars to politicians who are members of
both the Republican and Democratic parties. 232 Therefore, the
industry wields significant influence. 233 As such, politicians have
significantly undercut progress in regulating the lending industry
because they fear losing campaign funds. 234 If a law mandating full
public financing of federal elections were to be passed, the
purchasing of political influence through campaign contributions
would cease to be an issue. 235 Without this undue influence over
legislators, the banking industry would be unable to exert
comparable sway on the federal policy agenda.236 Legislators
would then be focused more on the issues important to constituents
than to their donors, and could develop sweeping consumer
protection legislation that would protect borrowers.

231

Connecticut AG Subpoenas Debt-Rating Agencies, USA TODAY, Oct.
26, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/
2007-10-26-credit-rating-agencies-subpoena_N.htm.
232
See Center for Responsive Politics, Mortgage Bankers and Brokers:
Long Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.
asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited July 27, 2008); Center for Responsive Politics,
Securities
and
Investments:
Long-Term
Contribution
Trends,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=F07 (last visited July 27,
2008).
233
See id.
234
See Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, supra note 198; see
also notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
235
Under the current campaign contribution system, major donors and
―bundlers,‖ individuals who recruit other donors to support politicians and
parties, are often lobbyists, or once the politician to whom they contribute wins
an election, they become lobbyists for various industries or causes, or sometimes
even officials in that candidate‘s administration. Editorial, Candidates Bungle
With Bundlers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2007, at 8.
236
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Prior to the mortgage collapse, Congress was under the
influence of the banking industry and its ability to provide millions
of dollars in campaign support.237 Consequently, it undercut
opportunities for regulation of the subprime lending market
through things like federal preemption. 238 Federal anti-predatory
lending laws had no real enforcement mechanisms, and were
focused more on mandating disclosures and preventing loans with
interest rates that skyrocketed above the norm. When states were
preempted from developing their own, more stringent legislative
solutions, state Attorneys General responded through the only
means with which they could act—they pursued suits against
unscrupulous lenders. These suits subjected the lenders to millions
of dollars in costs, but failed to truly compensate injured borrowers
or develop substantive change in the industry. Still, the suits
provided a valuable lesson to the Attorneys General, giving them
the opportunity to learn more about the problems at all stages in
the subprime market and to push for change at the federal level. As
the subprime industry has faced its inevitable collapse, Congress
finally has the opportunity to act through its introduction of H.R.
3915.
While H.R. 3915 is an imperfect and somewhat weak solution,
it is only the beginning of potential opportunities for change in
combating predatory lending. The public is becoming more aware
of the subprime market and is demanding change in the lending
industry. As a result, the opportunity is ripe to build upon H.R.
3915, to give the law the enforcement mechanisms necessary,
close its loopholes, and utilize the facts and strategies learned from
Attorney General Miller and his counterparts. The time is right to
develop more stringent state and federal regulations to combat
237

See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71; see also Center for Responsive
Politics, Mortgage Bankers and Brokers: Long-Term Contribution Trends,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited July
27, 2008); see also Center for Responsive Politics, Securities & Investments:
Long-Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.
asp?Ind=F07 (last visited July 27, 2008).
238
See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71.
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predatory lenders. These new regulations can take into account
substantive provisions that mirror those mentioned in the
Household and Ameriquest suits.
America is witnessing the collapse of not only the real estate
market, but the entire economy as a whole. Given this economic
landscape, it is critical that Congress, or the states, develop new
regulations to protect at-risk homeowners. As Americans see more
and more homes with windows boarded up and foreclosure notices
on the door, the government must act now to stop the scourge of
irresponsible and predatory lending. Homes, lives, and
communities are at stake.

